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NEW PARTNERSHIPS FOR A NEW WORLD
ORDER: NGOS, STATE ACTORS, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
POST-COLD WAR WORLD
Robert 0. Muller*
When the organization that I head co-founded the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines with a German humanitarian group in
1991, I could not have imagined that just six years later the landmine
movement would succeed in bringing to fruition the first major postCold War treaty stigmatizing a weapon, or that it would be named the
recipient of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. None of us involved in the
campaign imagined that our global effort would meet with such success
so quickly. Nor could we have imagined that now, one year after the
Nobel Committee's citation and the signing of the Ottawa Treaty,1 so
much would be left undone.
The world rightly celebrates our achievement. Commentators and
pundits cite the triumph of "civil society," foreign policy experts speak
of the emergence of a "global network" of activists, foundation presidents and political analysts hold forth on the value of the "new technologies" of the Internet, and politicians say that our campaign confirmed their call for "global interdependence." Even in the campaign
*

President, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation ("VVAF') and a 1974 graduate of

Hofstra University School of Law. VVAF, which he founded in 1979, is an international humanitarian organization dedicated to providing assistance to the civilian victims of war. In 1991, VVAF
co-founded and served as the coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which
received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. WAF runs a network of clinics that serve the rehabilitation
needs of the civilian victims of war in Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola, and El Salvador. To aid the
reader, footnotes have been added.
1. In December of 1997, representatives from 125 nations convened in Ottawa, Canada to
sign a treaty prohibiting the use of antipersonnel land mines. See Warren E. Leary, Better Weapons
Emerge For War Against Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at Fl. The Ottawa Treaty is also referred to as the Ottawa Convention. See Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Agrees to Land-Mine Ban, but
Not Yet, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1998, at A3. It specifically bans the "manufacture, stockpiling and
use of landmines... intended to kill or maim individuals." Id.
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itself, prominent activists argue that the success of the landmine movement has opened new vistas for "revolutionary global action" that will,
using the landmine campaign as a "model," successfully resolve a number of humanitarian problems-the recruitment of child soldiers, the
trade in light weapons, the spread of ethnic violence-a host of problems whose solution once seemed out of reach. After all, the Ottawa
Treaty that banned antipersonnel landmines was, as campaigners themselves like to say, "the people's treaty."
I would like to join this chorus, and certainly our organization has
considered doing so on a number of issues, but the truth of how the
landmine campaign triumphed is far more complex than the analysts
and pundits suppose. In fact, far from reflecting a model for a new
world order, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines reconfirmed
a number of salient lessons that are as old as the nation-state itself-that
it takes hard-nosed action, the careful recruitment of political influence
and power, and sheer doggedness to change official opinion. And it
takes money-lots and lots of money. Instead of celebrating the rise of
civil society, the usefulness of the Internet, and a global network of activists, we would do better to admit the truth of the modem post-Cold
War era-that change is much less the result of a "hands across the
world" strategy as it is an out-and-out political fistfight.
To be prepared for this world, non-governmental humanitarian organizations, like the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
("VVAF'), must engage in difficult and relentless political work that
involves building sophisticated political strategies, mounting expensive
public awareness campaigns, and forging alliances with unlikely allies
as well as friendly champions. And we should admit the obvious-the
fall of the Berlin Wall might have changed the way the world looks, but
it has not changed the way the world works. A review of our landmine
movement shows just how true this is.
The credibility of the international movement to ban landmines
was established at its inception. The campaign's co-founders, VVAF
and Medico International of Germany ("MIG"), had experience with
treating landmine victims in their overseas clinics and had firsthand
knowledge of an antipersonnel weapon's tragic effects.2 The international campaign simply could not have gained the attention it did unless
its founding organizations had a track record of service in providing as-

2. Those effects being the loss of an estimated 26,000 people worldwide that are killed or
wounded by landmines each year. See Francis X. Clines, 28-Year Quest to Abolish Land Mines
Pays Offfor Veteran, Who Fights On, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at A10.
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sistance to the innocent victims of war. Both VVAF and MIG were
careful to recruit similar organizations, non-governmental groups whose
credibility was above question and whose staff and leadership could
bring the requisite expertise of their own experience to bear on the
problem. A core group of humanitarian, veterans, and human rights organizations led this campaign from the beginning. Their experience
could not be ignored.
Putting together a core group of campaigners filled with good intentions, however, was not enough. We knew from the beginning of the
campaign that political power and political influence, including the
leadership of respected spokespersons whose own personal commitment
and moral beliefs were above criticism, would provide the essential fuel
to give our campaign "political life." Thankfully, our campaign was
supported by Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy. More than any other single individual, Senator Patrick Leahy is responsible for the success of
our worldwide movement. Without him the Ottawa Treaty and the Nobel Prize would not have been possible and the worldwide movement
that we launched would have died an early death. His own personal
commitment to banning the weapon, a natural result of visiting landmine clinics and seeing first-hand the unnecessary suffering of innocent
men, women, and children, provided our campaign with the political
impetus it needed.
In 1992, Senator Leahy proposed a moratorium on the export of
United States antipersonnel landmines.4 One year later, that moratorium
was extended for three years Other nations followed the United States'
lead. In 1994, Senator Leahy personally convinced President Clinton to
announce his intention to lead a worldwide effort for a ban in a highly
publicized speech at the United Nations, an unprecedented initiative that
brought recalcitrant governments into our movement and made many of
them partners in our effort. Unfortunately, while the Clinton Administration retreated from its preeminent role as the world leader on this is-

3. See id. (discussing the critical role that Senator Leahy played in insuring that the international ban on landmines became a reality).
4. See 138 CONG. REc. S12,723 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(introducing legislation which would place a one year moratorium on the selling, transferring, or
exporting of antipersonnel landmines by the United States); see also Clines, supra note 2, at A10
(explaining how, in 1992, Senator Leahy was able to engineer a ban on the exportation of landmines by the United States).
5. See 139 CONG. REc. S9290-91 (daily ed. July 22, 1993) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(introducing and discussing legislation which would extend the moratorium on landmines for another three years).
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sue, 6 Senator Leahy has continued to press his belief and retains his
stature as the leading humanitarian voice on this and other issues affecting the innocent victims of war. He was, and remains, a relentless proponent of this ban.' Our campaign owes him its success.
In 1996, VVAF took another step to give the landmine ban movement worldwide attention by recruiting senior United States retired
military officers as advocates in our efforts. In a "Letter to President
Clinton" printed as a full page advertisement in The New York Times,
these military leaders, including Desert Storm commander Norman
Schwartzkopf, Monterey Institute President and retired General Robert
Gard, and former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman David Jones along
with twelve others, urged the President to support a ban, arguing that it
would be a militarily responsible step to take. The call to action by these
generals was one of the most profoundly revolutionary steps that our
campaign could take. Coupled with Senator Leahy's efforts, it removed
our movement from the realm of the "radical" to the realm of the acceptable by confirming that progressive elements in our own society
could make common cause with establishment figures on issues of consequence. The letter stunned the White House and the nation's military
leadership and, I believe, forever changed the way that nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") should do business with the establishment.
Throughout these years, VVAF served as the coordinator of the
campaign, dispatching its own staff and the campaign's coordinator on a
series of global missions to recruit similarly minded organizations in
our efforts. A series of international conferences in Great Britain, Mozambique, Cambodia, Belgium, and Norway helped build a network of
country campaigns that pressed for a worldwide ban. In 1996, Canadian
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy announced that Canada would lead
an effort to bring together pro-ban nations for a treaty signing in Ottawa
6. See Myers, supra note 1, at A3 (explaining that the United States is presently one of the
few countries remaining that has not yet signed the Ottawa Treaty); see also Clines, supra note 2,
at A10 (discussing how President Clinton indicated that "he simply cannot risk a breach with the
Pentagon establishment by daring to sign the ban [on antipersonnel landmines]").
7. In fact, Senator Leahy has been so persistent in getting the United States to sign the
Otttawa Treaty that on May 15, 1998, the Clinton Administration sent him a letter pledging that by
2006, the United States would agree to sign it. See Myers, supra note I, at A3. Specifically, the
President pledged that the United States would "unilaterally halt its use of anti-personnel land
mines everywhere except in Korea by 2003 and altogether by 2006." Id. However, the Administration's pledge remains contingent on the ability of the Pentagon to develop an effective alternative to its landmines by such time. See id.
8. See Clines, supra note 2, at A10 (discussing how the retired military commander, in an
open letter to the President, urged the nation to support a ban on antipersonnel landmines).
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in 1997. The international campaign had focused for many years on re-

cruiting United States allies in its efforts, but Axworthy's announcement was a surprise, despite the fact that campaign leaders had specifi-

cally targeted him in their recruiting efforts. It is fully understood now
that Axworthy's move was both courageous and risky, as it called on the
international community to act outside of the traditional and cumbersome United Nations system of treaty negotiation.9 At the time of Axworthy's announcement, the international campaign was in danger of
seeing its efforts paralyzed by the international community, which had
failed to act to ban landmines in the more traditional forum of the Conference on Disarmament, where member nations are only bound by de-

cisions reached by consensus.
Just months before the Ottawa meeting, one of our campaign's
staunchest supporters, Princess Diana, was tragically killed in a car accident."° We should not underestimate the power that her personality had

on this issue. But her death, tragic though it certainly was, put the
landmine issue before the world public as few other events had. The
pictures of Princess Diana in Bosnia and in Angola, making her way
around minefields and compassionately seeing to the needs of landmine
victims, highlighted the truly humanitarian grounding of our movement.
By the end of 1997, the Clinton Administration had decided against
signing the landmine ban, in spite of Senator Leahy's efforts, Princess
Diana's commitment, and Lloyd Axworthy's courage." The Administration argued that banning the weapon would endanger American
lives, 2 a view that we refuted by showing that antipersonnel landmines

9. Cf. Anthony DePalma, Canada Peeved and Puzzled By Big Neighbor to the South, N.Y.
TIMs, Sept. 26, 1997, at Al (explaining how securing the signing of a treaty to ban landmines
was a favorite project of the Canadian Foreign Minister).
10. See generally Craig R. Whitney, Diana Killed in a Car Accident in Paris: In Flight
From Paparazzi-Friend Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, at Al (discussing the details of how
the famed Princess of Wales met her tragic death).
11. See Leary, supra note 1, at F1 (explaining how, in the end, the United States refused to
join the more than 125 nations that sent representatives to Ottawa for the purpose of signing a
treaty to ban antipersonnel landmines).
12. See Steven Lee Myers, Why Washington Likes Land Mines, N.Y. TMEm, Aug. 24, 1997,
at E5 (explaining how Pentagon strategists believe that antipersonnel landmines are necessary in
order to protect forces stationed in South Korea from an invasion by the North Koreans). American
military strategists contend that if American forces are not permitted to use mines in places such as
South Korea, they will be unable to thwart a large-scale invasion by the more than 900,000 North
Korean troops stationed along the demilitarized zone. See id. Pentagon officials also contend that
the United States cannot presently sign the Ottawa Treaty because it would prevent them from
continuing to deploy "smart" anti-tank mines. See id. Such mines not only destroy tanks, but also
act as antipersonnel mines by preventing soldiers who are not heavy enough to trigger an anti-tank
mine from lifting them out of a tank's path. See id.
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were the leading cause of United States casualties in the Vietnam War.
Despite widespread support for their "go slow" approach among the
American public, the White House was feeling the pressure of our political moves in Washington. Specifically, over a period of two years,
VVAF fought a running battle with the Administration in the press, on
Capitol Hill, and among the electorate. Our efforts engaged some of
Washington's most experienced political analysts, operatives, lobbyists,
and researchers.
Our decision to retain expert political consultants brought us criticism from some campaign organizations that viewed their efforts as
grounded in a grassroots movement that emphasized "people power."
Our team of political consultants, they said, was an elitist, inside-thebeltway crowd of political fixers far removed from the ideals of the
power-from-below strategy that had resulted in the campaign's early,
broad-based, international appeal.
We agreed with our critics that the efforts of grassroots organizations are essential and that our efforts would have ended in failure were
it not for those millions of people (including landmine victims and
deminers) who supported our efforts. But the simple unalterable and
undeniable truth of Washington is that it takes political power to effect
political change. 3 Our efforts in the United States, where we continue to
coordinate the growing United States Campaign to Ban Landmines,
were fueled by the conviction that an international treaty without United
States support would lack the necessary credibility and substance to be
adequately implemented and enforced.
Assuring that the United States signs this treaty has been and will
continue to be one of the major focuses of this organization. 4 We will
press ahead on all fronts in a broad-based campaign aimed at getting the
Administration to sign the treaty. Our program is aimed at the following: raising public awareness on the problem of landmines, pushing a
legislative package that provides aid both to landmine victims and to
organizations involved in demining, eliciting a pledge from every presidential candidate to sign the landmine treaty, and using our expanding
network of senior military officers, to push the Pentagon to recognize
that landmines are, in fact, a particularly insidious form of "friendly
fire" and that its victims are very often American soldiers.
A number of key international powers have failed to sign the Ot13. See Clines, supra note 2, at A10 (explaining how it takes political strength bolstered by
money in order to bring about change on issues such as the banning of antipersonnel landmines).
14. See id. (discussing how VYAF plans to put public pressure on potential candidates for
the 2000 Presidential election who have not taken a strong enough stance on the landmine issue).
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tawa Treaty; Russia, China, Iran, Egypt, and Israel are among them.
Clearly, while America's failure to sign the treaty has had a lasting influence, so will its decision to do so in the future. We remain convinced
that the United States' leadership can make a difference. It may well be
that Russia or China will not sign this treaty in the near future, and perhaps neither nation will sign it in the next ten years. But eventually, and
inevitably, they will-if the United States does so first.
The signing of the Ottawa Treaty does not mark an end to our efforts to end the suffering caused by landmines. The treaty itself, after
all, is simply a piece of paper-albeit an important one-that needs to
be given life and sustenance. Implementing the treaty will be our organization's goal in the months ahead. But just how we go about this is
vitally important. While the international campaign depended on a wide
array of NGOs to begin the campaign and to give it movement in its
first years, that core group must now be expanded to include a wider array of institutes, organizations, and think tanks.
Our organization will do this by using the political model that we
developed here in the United States to convince our government to support a ban. In the months ahead, we will engage senior retired and currently serving military officers of foreign governments to assure that
this treaty is expanded to include those nations that have not signed, that
it is ratified by governments that have not done so, and that it is enforced by those governments that have done both. This can only be accomplished by creating a global network that combines the skills and
networks of NGOs, disarmament institutes, and established military
think tanks-in other words, by expanding our reach globally in a way
that the international campaign did not.
Just as our recruitment of United States military officers significantly shifted the political debate in the United States, so too we believe
that recruiting senior retired military officers of foreign nations will
have as significant a shift in the conduct of international affairs. Certainly the kind of model of worldwide activism that this kind of structure implies is more likely to meet with success now than at any other
time in our nation's history. Prior to 1989, United States based humanitarian organizations steered clear of leading the charge on advocacy
campaigns. VVAF broke that mold, combining our humanitarian programs with a call to activism. Other organizations here in the United
States followed our lead. The fall of the Berlin Wall now means that organizations like ours can make common cause with traditional establishment institutions to solve worldwide problems.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:21

I am suggesting nothing less than a new NGO-state covenant 15 that
recognizes the overwhelming humanitarian crisis that the world now
faces as a result of the slaughter caused by the tens of millions of
landmines and that combines the resources of both communities to meet
it. Continuing to couple the financial resources of NGOs with governments is the one way to insure that the Ottawa Treaty becomes more
than a symbol of good will. More importantly, however, by engaging
the full array of individual and organizational research to deal with this
problem, the world community will be creating an engine of change to
deal with the root problem that landmines represent. It is in this area, in
dealing with this root problem, that the new partnership I speak of could
have the greatest impact.
Recently, I asked VAF's research department to study the effects
of conflict on civilian populations. Even though I have lived more than
one-half of this century and been a participant in one of this nation's
most controversial and bloody wars, I was still astounded and saddened
by the series of reports that I received. Over the last ten decades, hundreds of millions of human beings have died in wars. In World War II,
alone, nearly seventy million people died, fully one-third of them in the
Soviet Union. The role of our nation in fighting the evil of Hitler was
fundamental. But the truth is that while we proudly claim to have led the
globe in that conflict, the Soviet Union lost more troops in the Battle of
Berlin-the last battle of World War II in Europe-than the United
States lost in the entire war.
I was particularly struck by the numbers of civilian casualties of
the world's conflicts. At the beginning of this century, civilian deaths
accounted for just ten percent of all casualties in war. In World War II
that percentage skyrocketed. 16 Now, at the end of this century, civilian

15. Examples of NGOs include groups such as the Cambodia Documentation Commission,
Amnesty International, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. See Stephen P. Marks,
Forgetting "The PoliciesAnd Practices Of The Past": Impunity In Cambodia, 18 FLETcHER F.
WORLD AFr. 17, 23 & n.28 (1994).
16. See Judith G. Gardam, NoncombatantImmunity and the Gulf Conflict, 32 VA. J. INT'L L.
813, 821 (1992) (explaining how it is estimated that aerial bombardment by itself accounted for at
least 12 million civilian casualties during World War U); see also Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 401 & n.59 (1993) (discussing
how, by 1941, Britain's Chiefs of Staff changed its military strategy to include the direct targeting
of civilian enemy populations in order to terrorize such groups and hopefully bring a swift end to
the conflict); Matthew Lippman, Conundrums of Armed Conflict: CriminalDefenses to Violations
of the HumanitarianLaw of War, 15 DicK. J. INT'L L. 1, 60 (1996) (showing how the Allied
Forces during World War 11 would launch attacks against enemy cities for the purpose of gaining a
military advantage); Susan O'Rourke von Struensee, Violence, Exploitation and Children:Highlights of the UnitedNations Children's Convention and InternationalResponse to Children's Hit-
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deaths account for over ninety percent of all deaths in conflict.17 This is
a heart-rending, frightening, and simply breathtaking statistic. What this

means is that some of the most important nations of our world, including the United States, have consistently followed a policy that targets
women, children, the infirm, the elderly-in a phrase, the most vulnerable people on the planet."s
Worse yet, perhaps worst of all, my astonishment at this is not felt
universally or by even most of the American people. The vast majority
of Americans, our organization's research shows, simply believe that
huge numbers of civilian deaths are a natural outcome of war because,
most American argue, "that's what happens in war." It is no wonder that
the United States was slow to react to genocide in Cambodia, 9
Rwanda,'0 the Sudan,2' or even Bosnia.22 Our century (and Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and My Lai) has taught us to be immune to the sufferings of others, as if they have no effect on us.
Americans have a healthy respect for the rule of law, applying it
even to our highest elected officials. We would never tolerate the murder of a child in Los Angeles, Washington, or New York. We are outraged by the passionless crimes that seem to infect our society and we
expend billions of dollars to apprehend, try, and punish the perpetrators.
But we feel no such outrage, and take no such actions when children are
murdered in Rwanda or Bosnia. And yet, unless this nation and organizations like VVAF act now to enforce the rule of law internationally,
man Rights, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 589, 621 (1995) (showing how 50 percent of the
total casualties during World War 11 were civilians, as compared to the First World War, in which
the total number was five percent).
17. See BUREAU OF PoLrrCAL-MILrrARY AFFAiRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HIDDEN KILLERS
1998: THE GLOBAL LANDMINE CRIsIs at iii (1998) (statement of Secretary of State Madeline K.
Albright); von Struensee, supra note 16, at 621.
18. See Roger Normand & Chris af Jochnick, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical
Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387, 399-401 (1994) (discussing how attacks on
Iraqi infrastructure during the Gulf War by United Nation forces led by the United States resulted
in a sharp increase in Iraq's infant mortality rates).
19. See generally Marks, supra note 15, at 22-26 (explaining how slow the world has acted
in seeking the prosecution of national Khmer Rouge leaders for acts of genocide committed from
1975 to 1979).
20. Cf. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Dancers Leap Past Death To Reclaim Life's Rhythm, N.Y.
TMEs, July 8, 1998, at El (discussing the grotesque genocide of nearly 500,000 out of eight million Rwandans during several months in 1994).
21. See 2,000 Reported Slain in Sudan, N.Y. TmiEs, Jan. 5, 1990, at A2 (explaining how the
most recent "massacre" was linked to the conflict between the ruling forces in the Muslim north
and the mainly Christian and animist minority in the south).
22. See Danielle Lachman, Comment, Human Rights in Bosnia: Implementing An Effective
Prosecution, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 325, 325-30 (1993) (explaining how the United Nations has responded to acts of genocide committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
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the murders in Rwanda and Bosnia not only might, but almost certainly
will, come rolling down the street and into our own homes.
I was proud to serve as an Marine infantry lieutenant in Vietnam.
Despite my later opposition to the war, I served honorably-which
means that I made certain that the men under my command understood
that shooting unarmed civilians or surrendered soldiers was not acceptable, nor would it be condoned because of some belief that "that is what
happens in war." The killing of unarmed civilians is murder and it is a
war crime. It should be treated as such. It cannot be tolerated. To do so
now, at this point in our history, when the world is armed with weapons
of inestimable power, is to attack the foundations of civilization itself.
Unless we begin to enforce the rule of law internationally, humanity itself will be placed in grave danger.
1999 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Geneva Convention,
which detailed the laws under which nations can go to war,' and the one
hundredth anniversary of the Hague Convention, 24 the first international
meeting of nations attempting to constrain and restrict the horrifying
prospect of world destruction. It is truly fitting that the international
movement that my organization founded will come into force in the
same year that the International Committee of the Red Cross begins a
worldwide effort to increase public awareness of these humanitarian
covenants. It is our intention to use the opportunity afforded by this anniversary to form new and unique partnerships between humanitarian
organizations, private institutes, and governments to engender a new
found respect for the rule of law globally.
Admittedly, VVAF is committing itself to an ambitious programnot to outlaw war or even to assure that it will somehow magically
cease, but rather to build a global consensus that war, when waged, must
be conducted according to rules and laws that are instituted among nations for the good of all to insure that while soldiers may die in combat,
the human race itself will not be placed in jeopardy. We seek nothing
less than the reversal of the "well, that's what happens in war" attitude
of millions of Americans, a view that is shared, I am quite sure, by billions of people worldwide. I do not hold with those who shrug off our
efforts on this next major campaign, who claim that the new NGO-

23. The Geneva Convention was actually a series of four conventions which were opened for
signature on August 12, 1949. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c) (Supp. II 1997); Stephen R. Samoski, The
Status Under InternationalLaw of Civilian PersonsServing with orAccompanying Armed Forces
in the Field,ARMY LAW., July 1994, at 29, 29.
24. One of several landmark Hague Conventions on the laws and customs of war was signed
in 1899. See von Struensee, supranote 16, at 619.
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government partnership that we envision cannot actually reach the goal
of dampening human conflict and alleviating human suffering. These
same critics were present in 1991-when we began the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines.
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